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I. INTRODUCTION
A number of disabled former employees have turned to the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to redress alleged
discrimination in their termination or in the benefit plans of their
former employers.' Several courts, however, have held that these
plaintiffs are not "qualified individual[s] with a disability,"2 and,
therefore, may not recover under the ADA.3 Other courts of appeals
have recently found the ADA's proscription of discrimination in the
"terms, conditions, and privileges of employment"4 to contradict the
definition of qualified individuals. 5  These courts resolved the
ambiguity by allowing disabled former employees a federal right to
sue their former employers for denying certain disability benefits.
6
This difference of opinion presents a significant problem for
employers, employees, and insurers. Support payments to the
1. The typical benefits discrimination case arises when a former employee complains of a
distinction in an employer's disability benefits program between physically disabled former em-
ployees and mentally disabled former employees. See, e.g., Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
875 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (W.D. Tenn. 1995), affd en banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997)
(observing that plaintiffs former employer had provided disability benefits through age 65 for
physically disabled former employees while providing only 24 months of benefits to mentally
disabled former employees). In this situation, an employee suffers no harm from the distinction
until he becomes disabled and no longer able to work, at which time he becomes eligible for
benefits. A termination discrimination case arises when a former employee complains that his
employer terminated the employment relationship because of the disability. See, e.g., Rogers v.
International Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755, 757-59 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff
suffered an ankle injury rendering him unable to work and was subsequently terminated during
a reduction in production). In this situation, an employee is unable to work at the time of
termination. See id. at 759.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
3. See, e.g., EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding employee
lacked standing to sue under Title I of the ADA); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d
1523, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding employee failed to satisfy the "qualified individual with
a disability" requirement, as the employee was not employed during alleged discrimination);
Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759, 761 (employee was not a "qualified individual with a disability" under
the ADA because he was unable to attend work); Fobar v. City of Dearborn Heights, 994 F.
Supp. 878, 884 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding employee does not satisfy ADA's "qualified individual
with a disability" definition because he was unable to perform police officer duties); Dickey v.
Peoples Energy Corp., 955 F. Supp. 886, 889-90 (N.D. I1. 1996) (holding plaintiff lacked
standing to sue under ADA when he failed to consistently perform essential job functions);
Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1326 (granting defendants' motions to dismiss for plaintiffs failure to
show standing under the ADA).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
5. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606-07 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding ambi-
guity in provision's text defining "employee"), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Castellano v.
City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing that Congress left textual ambiguity
in the ADA's provision as to "employee"), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 60 (1998).
6. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 607; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 69.
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disabled amount to billions of dollars annually,7 and a large
percentage of current workers will ultimately suffer a disability.8
Given these economic and demographic realities, if the approach of
the Second and Third Circuits gains momentum, litigation on the
issue will force a great number of employers and insurers to defend
the structure of their benefit plans. While this litigation will not
likely force employers and insurers to change their plans to end
discrimination among disabilities--discrimination that the ADA does
not prohibit-the cost of this litigation will naturally pass first to
employers,o and then to consumers.
This Note argues that those courts of appeals that granted a
right to sue under the ADA to former employees alleging dis-
crimination in post-employment benefits found ambiguity where none
existed. In so doing, these courts rendered useless the "essential
functions" requirement of the ADA. Besides reaching a result
contrary to the express language of the Act, these courts leave
unresolved the question of eligibility to sue in termination
discrimination cases, where ADA protection is impossible by the
terms of the statute. This serves only to complicate matters for
employers, who must, under the holdings of these courts, address the
possibility of discrimination in their benefits plans and who, given the
implications of these decisions, may be forced to retain disabled
employees unable to perform the essential functions of their jobs.
7. The value of support payments to the disabled and lost productivity from under-
utilization of the skills of disabled workers totals $200 to $300 billion annually. See Ben Cristal,
Note, Going Beyond the Judicially Prescribed Boundaries of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 493, 495 (1996) (citing Tony Coelho, Disabilities Laws Work, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Aug. 4, 1995, (Letters to the Editor), at A12).
8. One in five people will experience a diagnosable mental illness in his life. See
DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET AL., THE ADA AND PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: A RESOURCE
MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 60 (citing OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NUMBER OF U.S. ADULTS WITH MENTAL
DISORDERS (1992)). This figure, which represents the probability of mental disability, when
combined with the probability for physical disability, makes it clear that disabilities will cut
short the careers of many Americans.
9. See, e.g., Ford, 145 F.3d at 608, 614 (concluding that the ADA prohibits discrimination
between individuals with disabilities and non-disabled individuals, not discrimination among
various disabilities); Castellano, 142 F.3d at 70 (same).
10. See Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's
Financial Hardship Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 391, 440-41 (1995) (suggesting that ambiguity in ADA terms will result in litigation costs
to employers); see also Recent Case, Third Circuit Holds That Unemployable Former Employees
May Sue Employer: Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 112 HARv. L. REv. 1118, 1118, 1123 (1999)
(suggesting that the Third Circuit's decision to find a right to sue former employers for alleged
discrimination in post-employment benefits may result in increased litigation costs).
1999]
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Part II of this Note reviews the historical development of
federal statutory protections for disabled employees under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA and explains the judicial conclusion
that neither act protects former employees who are unable to perform
the essential functions of their former jobs. Part HI examines the
recent holdings of the Second and Third Circuits and argues that
these courts arrive at a result contrary to the express language of the
statute. Part IV argues that, in light of the limitations placed on the
ADA, Congress-not the judiciary-has the option of changing the
meaning of the statute. In addition, this Note observes that the
application of the Second and Third Circuits' benefits discrimination
reasoning to discrimination in termination cases is irrational. Given
the express language of the ADA and the silence of Congress on the
issue, courts should continue to interpret the ADA as not providing a
cause of action for former employees.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ACTS PROTECTING
DISABLED EMPLOYEES
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first law to prohibit
discrimination against otherwise qualified persons with disabilities."
Yet the Rehabilitation Act did not go so far as to protect completely
disabled former employees from discrimination. 12 Since the ADA shall
be interpreted consistently with the Rehabilitation Act,13 a number of
courts have relied on the earlier act and refused to extend the ADA's
protections to completely disabled former employees. 4
A. The Rehabilitation Act
The Rehabilitation Act protects the employment positions and
benefits of employees and participants in programs receiving federal
financial assistance. 5 Under the Act, no such program can discrim-
11. See IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WrrH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 11, 18 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993).
12. See Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a disabled plaintiff unable to perform the functions of her job is ineligible to sue
under the Rehabilitation Act).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994) (stating that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are to be
interpreted in a manner that "prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards").
14. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (W.D. Tenn. 1995)
affd en banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
15. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 1998) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
772 [Vol. 52:769
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inate against an otherwise qualified handicapped individual solely
because of his handicap.'
6
The applicability of the Rehabilitation Act to individuals who
are unable to fulfill certain program requirements due to their
handicap quickly became an issue. 17 In Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the
Rehabilitation Act's protections extended to individuals who would be
able to fulfill the requirements of a position or program were it not for
their handicap. 18 Instead, the Court held that under the statute's
plain language, protection extended only to handicapped individuals
able to fulfill the requirements of a program in spite of their
handicap. 19 The Court observed that allowing the disabled access to
programs for which they are qualified notwithstanding their handicap
reinforced Congress's intent to provide even-handed treatment of
individuals with disabilities.20
The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar question when an
individual's disability left her unable to perform some of the functions
of herjob.21 The court held that the Rehabilitation Act did not provide
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.").
16. See ad
17. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979). In
Southeastern, a student at a state college receiving federal funds sought training as a nurse. Id.
The college denied her access to the nursing program after learning of the student's hearing
disability. See id. at 401-02. The college concluded that the student's ability to hear only when
able to read a person's lips made the student's practice of nursing unsafe. See id. at 401.
18. Id. at 406. The Court observed that "[taken literally, this holding would prevent an
institution from taking into account any limitation resulting from the handicap, however
disabling." Id. Under this interpretation, a blind person possessing all the qualifications for
driving a bus except for the ability to see would be "otherwise qualified" for the position of bus
driver. See id at 407 n.7. The Court discarded the notion "that a person need not meet legiti-
mate physical requirements in order to be 'otherwise qualified,'" instead finding that requiring
a person to meet the requirements of a program came closer to the plain meaning of the statute.
Id at 406. The Court found support for this conclusion in the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. See id.
19. See id.
20. See idt at 410. The Court rejected a more expansive view of congressional intent-that
Congress, through the Rehabilitation Act, imposed an obligation on programs receiving federal
assistance to take measures to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps. See id. The
Rehabilitation Act placed this obligation on the federal government, but not upon state agencies
such as Southeastern Community College. See id at 410-11.
21. See Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987). The case
involved a plaintiff who had been under the defendant's employ for seven years when she was
hospitalized and terminated. See id. at 769. An arbitrator, acting under the terms of the
plaintiffs employment contract, found that the termination was procedurally improper and
ordered reinstatement. See id. at 769-70. After reinstatement, plaintiff notified defendant of
her inability to work and applied for benefits under a salary continuation program, a disability
insurance program, and a health insurance program. See id. at 770. When defendant refused to
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a cause of action for individuals whose disabilities leave them
completely unable to work because, under the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Southeastern Community College, these individuals are
not "otherwise qualified."
22
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Rehabilitation Act prohibited the federal government, its
contractors, and recipients of federal funds from discriminating
against qualified individuals with disabilities.2 The Americans with
Disabilities Act went farther. The ADA's protections apply not just to
recipients of federal funds but to employers engaged in industries
affecting interstate commerce.2
As with the Rehabilitation Act, courts soon faced the issue of
discrimination against former employees. In Parker v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., the court held that the ADA's protections do not
apply to former employees who are unable to work.25 The plaintiff
sued under the ADA when her disability benefits expired.26 Plaintiffs
employer had provided long-term disability benefits that
distinguished disability arising from mental disorders, for which a
disabled former employee collected twenty-four months of benefits,
from disability based upon physical disorders, for which a disabled
former employee received benefits until age sixty-five.27  In
adjudicating the ADA Title I claim, the court relied upon the Eighth
Circuit's holding that, under the Rehabilitation Act, a completely
provide the salary and health insurance benefits, the plaintiff sued. See id. The district court
found that the Rehabilitation Act applied to defendant because of defendant's receipt of federal
funds, but held that the Act did not apply to plaintiff because she was no longer able to perform
the functions of her job. See id. at 770-71.
22. See id. at 771. The Eighth Circuit observed that while the equities of the case may
suggest a contrary result, the language of the Rehabilitation Act is clear. See id. (I"hough it
may seem undesirable to discriminate against a handicapped employee who is no longer able to
do his or her job, this sort of discrimination is simply not within the protection of [the
Rehabilitation Act].").
23. See Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S.933, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1165-66 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.N. 601-02.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994). The ADA also limits the term "employer" to those
business entities that have employed 15 or more employees during each working day for 20 or
more consecutive calendar weeks. See id. During the two year period immediately following
the effective date of the Act, the business entity must have employed 25 or more employees
during each working day for 20 or more consecutive calendar weeks to be considered an
.employer" under the Act. See id.
25. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (W.D. Tenn. 1995), affd
en banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).




disabled former employee is not "otherwise qualified."2 Since
Congress intended the ADA to be interpreted consistently with the
Rehabilitation Act,29 the court found a disabled former employee not a
"qualified individual with a disability."3 0
The Eleventh Circuit later rejected a similar claim of post-
employment benefits discrimination in Gonzales v. Garner Food
Services, Inc.31 As a Garner employee, plaintiffs decedent, Bourgeois,
was entitled to health care benefits of up to $1 million.32 After
Bourgeois was diagnosed with AIDS, Garner terminated him, prior to
the effective date of the ADA.33 Bourgeois continued his health care
coverage under COBRA.34 Garner subsequently amended its benefit
plan to limit AIDS benefits to $10,000 annually and $40,000 lifetime. 5
At the time of his death, Bourgeois had exhausted his Garner
benefits, and claims totaling $90,000 had been denied.3 6
The court analyzed plaintiffs ADA claim and noted that the
decedent's termination and the reduction in AIDS benefits occurred
before the ADA became effective3 7 Plaintiff nonetheless alleged that
maintaining the limitation on AIDS benefits beyond the effective date
of the ADA-in effect discrimination between plan members with
AIDS and members without AIDS-constituted a violation of the
general rule of Title I. 8 While both parties in Gonzales agreed that
health care benefits constitute one of the "terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment" protected from unlawful discrimination
28. See id. at 1325 (citing Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th
Cir. 1987)).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994) (stating that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are to be
interpreted in a manner that "prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards").
30. See Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1326:
As with plaintiff in the present case, it may seem undesirable and perhaps unpalatable
that a totally disabled individual is not entitled to relief under Title I of the ADA.
However, the plain language of the Act clearly indicates that the ADA was designed to
afford relief only to those individuals with disabilities who can perform the essential
functions of the job that they hold or seek.
31. Gonzales v. Garner Food Serv., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
32. See id. at 1524.
33. See id
34. See id. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA) re-
quires employers to allow former employees to continue coverage under the employer's group
health insurance plan for up to 18 months following termination of employment. See id. at 1524
n.3 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162 (1994)).
35. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1524.
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under the ADA,39 the court found Bourgeois not a qualified individual
with a disability and therefore unprotected from discrimination.40
The Eleventh Circuit reached this conclusion after observing that
Bourgeois neither held nor desired to hold a position with Garner
when the discriminatory conduct occurred, but that Bourgeois was
instead a participant in the health care plan only by virtue of his
status as a former employee.
41
Disabled former employees have not restricted their actions to
claims of benefits discrimination. In Rogers v. International Marine
Terminals, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff unable to perform
the functions of his job at the time of termination is not a qualified
individual with a disability under the ADA.42 The Rogers plaintiff
took paid sick leave for pain in his ankle; when his sick leave expired,
he received a year of disability benefits through a company plan.
43
Plaintiff underwent ankle surgery, but his physician did not approve
his return to work until the end of the one year disability period."
Eleven months earlier the employer downsized and terminated
plaintiff, ceasing his disability benefits.45  Plaintiff admitted to his
inability to work at the time of termination, so the Fifth Circuit found
him not a "qualified individual" under the Act.46
39. Id. at 1526. Generally, the ADA prohibits discrimination in the "terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). In its explanation of the Act, the
House Committee on Education and Labor stated that:
[E]mployers may not deny health insurance coverage completely to an individual based
on the person's diagnosis or disability. For example, while it is permissible for an em-
ployer to offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures or treat-
ments, e.g., only a specified number of blood transfusions per year, a hemophiliac who
exceeds this treatment limit may not be denied coverage for other conditions, such as a
broken leg or for heart surgery, because of the existence of the hemophilia .... All
people with disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance coverage that is
provided by the employer to all employees.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 59 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.N. 303, 341. Similarly, the
House Committee on the Judiciary, to which the bill was referred in order to establish a clear
and comprehensive prohibition on discrimination on the basis of disability, stated that:
[E]mployers may not deny health insurance coverage completely to an individual based
on the person's diagnosis or disability. For example, it is permissible for an employer to
offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures or treatments .... It
would not be permissible, however, to deny coverage to individuals.., who are affected
by these limits on coverage for procedures or treatments, for other procedures or treat-
ments connected with their digability.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 38 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C-N. 445, 460-61.
40. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1526.
41. See id.
42. Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996).
43. See id. at 757.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 759. The Fifth Circuit may have applied the protections of the ADA to
Rogers had he been able to return to work in a period of time less than 11 months from the date
776
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In reaching the conclusion that disabled former employees are
not "qualified individuals" under the ADA, courts have had to deal
with a number of counter-arguments. Some plaintiffs have
analogized the ADA to Title VII and suggested that, given Title VII's
protection of former employees from post-employment retaliation, the
ADA should also protect former employees from post-employment
discrimination.47 Other plaintiffs have argued that, despite the
"essential functions" requirement, Congress must have intended the
ADA to protect former employees because many employment benefits
are realized after employment.48 Still other plaintiffs have suggested
that their status as a benefits recipient qualifies as an employment
position, the essential functions of which they are able to fulfill.49
Finally, some plaintiffs have proposed that Congress intended the
ADA to prohibit discrimination among individuals with various
disabilities. so
1. Relationship Between the Anti-Retaliation Provisions of Title VII
and the Claims of Former Employees Under the ADA
Some ADA plaintiffs have asserted that former employees
should be protected from post-employment discrimination just as
former employees are protected from post-employment retaliation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.51 Title VII prohibits
retaliation against employees or applicants who oppose unlawful
employment practices or participate in the processing of an unlawful
employment practice claim.52 Although the text of Title VII limits
anti-retaliation protection to employees and applicants, the Supreme
Court has expanded its reach to former employees. 53
of termination. See Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("An essential function of
any ... job is an ability to appear for work.., and to complete assigned tasks within a reason-
able period of time" (emphasis added)), quoted in Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759.
47. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner
Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996).
48. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1526.
49. See CNA, 96 F.3d at 1043; Dickey v. Peoples Energy Corp., 955 F. Supp. 886, 889-90
(N.D. Ill. 1996).
50. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015-19 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998); Cramer v. Florida, 885 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (M.D.
Fla. 1995), affd, 117 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1997).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aXl) (1994). Title VII generally prohibits an employer's
refusal to hire individuals or discharge employees based upon race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. See id.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
53. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1997); see also Veprinsky v. Fluor
Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that former employees may bring an
1999] 777
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Courts have used two lines of reasoning in rejecting the
proposition that, by analogy to Title VII, disabled former employees
should have a right of action under the ADA. First, retaliation claims
have a nexus to employment while post-employment benefits
discrimination claims have no such connection.M Second, realizing
the purpose of Title VII requires expanding protection to former
employees, while no such expansion is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the ADA.55 Post-employment retaliation in Title VII
actions has a nexus to the employment relationship because the
action against which the former employer retaliates occurred during
the former employee's employment.56 This nexus is absent, however,
from former employees' complaints of discrimination in benefits pro-
grams since no discrimination occurs during employment.57
Furthermore, the original expansion of Title VII anti-retaliation
protection to former employees was based on the remedial nature of
the statute: without protection of former employees, the anti-
retaliation provisions of Title VII would be rendered useless. 58 The
ADA, however, contains no anti-retaliation provision; allowing former
employees to sue for benefit discrimination is thus unnecessary to
effectuate the purpose of the Act.59 In addition, allowing disabled
former employees to bring actions would actually render meaningless
the express provision of the ADA that requires that an individual be
able to perform the essential functions of an employment position in
order to sue.60  Given the primary canon of statutory
interpretation-that a court should construe a statute in accordance
with its ordinary meaning 6l--courts have elected to give effect to the
action under Title VIrs anti-retaliation provisions when a former employer retaliates against a
protected activity that occurred while the individuals were employees); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850
F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the remedial purpose of Title VII requires that
the plain meaning rule not apply to retaliation cases brought by former employees).
54. See CNA, 96 F.3d at 1045 (distinguishing the facts of Veprinsky from the case at bar).
55. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1996).
56. See CNA, 96 F.3d at 1045 ("[T]he law in this Circuit permits former employees who
are suffering retaliation for protected activity while they were employees to bring an action
under Title VII anti-retaliation provisions").
57. See id. Furthermore, discrimination in fringe benefits, which involves a distinction
between whole classes (e.g., the mentally disabled versus the physically disabled), lacks the pro-
tected individual interest that exists in retaliation cases. See id.
58. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1527-29 (citing Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509
(11th Cir. 1988)).
59. See id at 1528-29.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (1994); id. § 12112 (a) (1994).
61. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Bailey, 850 F.2d at 1506, 1509).
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express provisions of the ADA rather than to loosely analogous
language in Title VII.62
2. Benefits Receipt as an Indelible ADA Protection
Some plaintiffs have argued that since the benefits of many
plans are realized during the post-employment period, Congress must
have intended the ADA to protect former employees.63 The Gonzales
court rejected this proposition and instead looked to the text of the
ADA and its legislative history to reach the conclusion that the Act
covers only employees and applicants able to perform the essential
functions necessary for employment.64 As the Beauford and Parker
courts observed, the protections of the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, respectively, do not apply to all individuals with disabilities but
only to "qualified" individuals with disabilities.65 The Act defines
"qualified" individuals as those "who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."66 Thus,
while some benefits may be realized after employment, the express
language of the Act limits its protections to individuals who are
currently employed or who currently seek employment.67
3. Benefits Recipient as an Employment Position
At least one ADA plaintiff has argued that the Act's protec-
tions should apply to a disabled former employee because he holds the
employment position of benefits recipient.68 This argument finds its
roots in the definition of "qualified individual," which is limited to one
62. See CNA, 96 F.3d at 1045; Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528-29.
63. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1526 ("Appellant... argues that since the fruits of many
fringe benefits are realized during the post-employment period, Congress must have intended
former employees to be protected under the ADA as well").
64. See id. at 1526-27.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994); Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d
768, 771 (8th Cir. 1987); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321, 1325-26 (W.D.
Tenn. 1995) affd en banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). The House Committee on Education and Labor included
the "essential function" language to "ensure that employers can continue to require that all ap-
plicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are able to perform the essential, i.e.,
the non-marginal functions of the job in question." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 55 (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
67. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1527-28 (limiting protection to these individuals).
68. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The EEOC's principal
theory ... asserts that [the disabled former employee's] 'employment position' vis-a-vis CNA is
now that of'disabled benefit recipient.' ").
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who "can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires."19 Rather than argue that the
definition of "qualified individual" should be expanded to include
former employees, the CNA plaintiff proposed a "strained"
alternative-expansion of the term "employment position."70  If a
court regarded a completely disabled former employee as holding the
employment position of "benefits recipient," that individual could
perform the essential functions of the position because no essential
functions exist.71  The Seventh Circuit summarily rejected this
argument, stating that "[an 'employment position' is a job."72
4. Differing Benefit Levels for Various Disabilities
While the limitation of ADA protection to employees and
applicants for employment has been sufficient to deal with most
claims of disabled former employees alleging discrimination in fringe
benefit plans, some courts have chosen to address the issue of
whether Congress intended the ADA to eliminate disparate benefit
levels for different disabilities. The Supreme Court has held that
Congress intended the Rehabilitation Act, the forerunner to the ADA,
to prohibit discrimination between the disabled and non-disabled, not
discrimination between those with various disabilties.73 A number of
circuit and district courts have since applied the same reasoning to
the ADA7 4 This conclusion is supported by the fact that in 1996,
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
70. CNA, 96 F.3d at 1043.
71. See id. at 1043-44 (noting that there are no essential functions imposed on
beneficiaries of disability plans other than collecting benefits checks).
72. Id. at 1044. (declaring that the court "need not tarry long" on the benefits-recipient-as-
a-job argument); see also Dickey v. Peoples Energy Corp., 955 F. Supp. 886, 890 (N.D. IlM. 1996)
(quoting CNA, 96 F.3d at 1043-44).
73. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1988) (upholding a special benefit for
veterans disabled for reasons other than their own "willful misconduct" despite the fact that the
benefit was unavailable to other disabled veterans).
74. See, e.g., Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998) (holding that the ADA does not prohibit an insurance
company from differentiating between various disabilities); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr.,
95 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding plan excluding infertility regardless of disability);
Rogers v. Department of Health and Envtl. Control, 985 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D.S.C. 1997)
(upholding long term disability plan with different benefits for physical and mental disabilities),
aft'd, No. 97-2780, 1999 WL 193895 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 1999); Cramer v. Florida, 885 F. Supp.
1545, 1550-53 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (upholding Florida workers' compensation statute that granted
greater benefits to persons with "disabilities" than persons with "impairments"), affd, 117 F.3d
1258 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Nicole Martinson, Inequality Between Disabilities: The Different
Treatment of Mental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50
BAYLOR L. REv. 361, 373-77 (1998) (discussing the reasoning of a number of courts on the
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Congress passed the Mental Health Parity Act, which requires health
insurance plans to equalize limitations on medical or surgical benefits
with limitations on mental health benefits.75 If Congress believed
that the ADA mandated this parity, it would not have passed the
Mental Health Parity Act.76
IH. COURTS' RECENT ExPANsIoN OF PROTECTIONS FOR
FORMER EMPLOYEES
While the holdings of a number of courts illustrate the
acceptance of the proposition that disabled former employ-
ees-whether bringing claims of benefits discrimination or dis-
crimination in termination-may not sue under the ADA,7 the Second
and Third Circuits have allowed disabled former employees an ADA
cause of action for benefits discrimination. 8 These courts found
ambiguity, based either on the ADA's failure to provide a temporal
qualification to the qualified individual requirement,7 9 or the ADA's
creation of rights inconsistent with eligibility to sue,80 where none
existed, prompting an analysis of the ADA's purpose.8' These courts
then imitated the Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinson without
giving consideration to the differences between the ADA and Title
VII;82 by granting disabled former employees a right to sue, the courts'
holdings render the "essential fimctions" requirement of the ADA
meaningless.8
question of whether benefit level distinctions between disabilities violates the ADA). An in-
depth discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (Supp. H 1996).
76. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1017-18 (arguing that Congress did not intend the ADA to
create parity in long term disability plans).
77. See cases cited supra note 3.
78. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606-07 (3d Cir. 1998) (resolving tex-
tual ambiguity to allow employee to sue), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Castellano v. City
of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (using an analogy to Title VII to allow cause of
action), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 60 (1998).
79. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67.
80. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 605-06.
81. See id. at 607; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68.
82. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606-07; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68-69.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (stating that "[tihe term 'qualified individual with a
disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accomodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires."); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination "against a qualified individual
with a disability"); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "interpreting the ADA to allow any disabled former employee to sue a former
employer essentially renders the [qualified individual with a disability] requirement
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A. Expansion Based Upon ADA Ambiguity Resulting from
the Statute's Failure to Specify When a Plaintiff
Must Be a Qualified Individual
Plaintiffs' claims in Castellano v. City of New York arose in
much the same way as the claims of other benefits discrimination
plaintiffs. In that case, fire and police force retirees asserted
discrimination in retirement benefits when they were denied a
variable supplemental benefit ("VSF") in addition to their retirement
and disability incomes.M In evaluating plaintiffs' claims, the Second
Circuit initially remarked that, where statutory language is clear, the
court should focus only on the text, but where the language is
ambiguous, the court may consider the broader context of the statute
and its purpose.5 The court asserted that the ADA definition of
"qualified individual with a disability" fails to specify when a plaintiff
must have been a "qualified individual." 6 The absence of a temporal
limitation in the term "qualified individual with a disability," the
court concluded, renders the ADA ambiguous and allows the court to
delve into the broader context of the statute.
87
... meaningless.") Ignoring the express provisions of the Act, compare Ford, 145 F.3d at 606-07
(allowing former employee to sue), and Castellano, 142 F.3d at 69 (granting disabled former
employees a right to sue under the ADA despite their inability to perform the essential
functions of their employment position), with sources cited supra note 3 (holding that disabled
former employees unable to perform the essential functions of their employment position have
no right to sue under the ADA), and creatively reading its legislative history, see Castellano, 142
F.3d at 67 (misconstruing the House of Representatives' temporal qualification to the qualified
individual requirement), proved largely unnecessary, however, given these courts' ultimate
conclusion that the disabled plaintiffs' claims fail on their merits. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 614;
Castellano, 142 F.3d at 70.
84. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 63. The City of New York offered three retirement plans
to its fire and police force retirees. See id. at 63-64. Ordinary disability retirement, the first of
these plans, was for physically or mentally disabled officers who could no longer perform their
duties. See id. (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 13-251, 13-352 (1970)). Accident disability re-
tirdment, the second plan, was for officers whose physical or mental incapacitation was the re-
sult of service to the city. See id. at 64 (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 13-252, 13-353 (1970)).
The third plan, retirement for service, was for officers who had provided 20 years of service to
the city and who did not elect to retire with disability benefits. See id. (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 13-246, 13-247, 13-249, 13-350 (1970)). Some retirees may have provided twenty years
of service but would not fall within the "for service" option because they elected to receive
disability benefits. See id. The VSF benefit was available only to retirees who fell within the
"for service" plan. See id. To receive the VSF benefit, the retiree must have retired after the
VSF-eligibility date applicable to the branch of uniform service in which the retiree served. See
id. For example, fire and municipal police officers who retired before October 1, 1968, were
ineligible to receive VSF benefits, while the VSF-eligilibity date for transit police officers was
July 1, 1987. See id. at 64-65.
85. See id. at 67 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1997)).
86. Id. at 67 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
87. See id.
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At this critical juncture, the Second Circuit misconstrued the
legislative history of the ADA,88 opening the door for an expansionist
interpretation of the Act. The court quoted the language of the House
committee report: "[D]etermination of whether a person is qualified
should be made at the time of the [discriminatory] employment
action, e.g. hiring or promotion, and should not be based on the
possibility that the employee or applicant will become incapacitated
and unqualified in the future."89
The Second Circuit proposed that a "literal reading" of this
language suggests that" 'at the time of the employment action' refers
to the actual moment when the employer perform[s] the [allegedly]
discriminatory act."9o The court observed that this interpretation of
the ADA's legislative history would allow employers to lawfully
discriminate against individuals not qualified at the time of the
discriminatory act, which may occur years after the employment
relationship has ended.91 This result, "unsatisfactory" to the court,
supposedly compelled the court's conclusion that the ADA's text is
ambiguous. 92 For the court to reach this result, however, it had to
hold that "employment action" does not equate with discriminatory
act-i.e., holding that the ADA fails to specify when a plaintiff must
have been a qualified individual.93 If any doubt existed as to whether
"employment action" equated with "discriminatory act," the court
removed it and undermined its own position by adding
"[discriminatory]" to its quotation of the House Report.9
The finding that the term "qualified individual" was ambigu-
ous allowed the court to look beyond the "inconclusive and unsatisfac-
tory legislative history" and to examine the broader context and pur-
pose of the Act.95 A significant hurdle in the court's path to establish-
ing a right of action for disabled retirees in benefits discrimination
88. See id.
89. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485(M), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN.
445,456).
90. Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67. Here, the allegedly discriminatory act was the city's with-




94. Compare id. (stating that "determination of whether a person is qualified should be
made at the time of the [discriminatory] employment action"), with H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(m),
at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 456 (noting that "determination of whether a
person is qualified should be made at the time of the employment action"). "[Dliscriminatory"
did not appear in the text of the House report, but was added in the text of the Castellano
opinion.
95. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67.
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claims under the ADA was the "essential functions" element of the
definition of "qualified individual with a disability."9 Congress in-
cluded the "essential functions" language to avoid compelling employ-
ers to hire, promote, or retain employees who are unable to perform
the functions oftheirjob.97 Several other courts have held that former
employees who are unable to perform the essential functions of an
employment position are unable to sue under the ADA.98 The
Castellano court, however, reached the contrary result by reasoning
that retirees, while unable to presently perform the essential func-
tions of an employment position with their former employer, never-
theless satisfy the "essential functions" requirement because they
were once able to perform the functions of their jobs.99
The court's reasoning sabotages the temporal determination of
qualification the court earlier propounded. 1 ° Even though currently
disabled retirees were once able to perform the essential functions of
their employment, they nonetheless fail to meet the ADA's standards
for qualification in that they were unable to perform the essential
functions of their employment position at the time of the allegedly
discriminatory action. The Castellano court then declared this
"essential functions" requirement ambiguous, 10 and concluded that
disabled retirees fulfill the requirement by having been able to
perform the functions of their employment positions at some time
other than when the allegedly discriminatory act occurred.02
Having eliminated the roadblock that the "essential functions"
definition presented, the Castellano court turned to the ADA's
purpose. One express purpose of the Act is "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (" 'qualified individual with a disability' means an indi-
vidual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the esse-
ntial functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires").
97. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 55 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337:
The point of including this phrase ... is to ensure that employers can continue to
require that all applicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are able to
perform the essential, i.e., the non-marginal functions of the job in quesiton [sic] ... the
Committee intends to reaffirm that this legislation does not undermine an employer's
ability to choose and maintain qualified workers.
98. See cases cited supra note 3.
99. Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68.
100. See id. at 67 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1Im), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 456) (stating that "determination of whether a person is qualified should be
made at the time of the [discriminatory] employment action").
101. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67.
102. See id. at 68.
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against individuals with disabilities."10 3 Barring suits of disabled
retirees, the court intoned, violates this purpose because it leaves
disabled former employees unprotected from discrimination in the
provision of post-employment benefits. 1°4 The court found support for
this conclusion in Robinson, wherein the Supreme Court held that
former employees filing anti-retaliation suits under Title VII have a
right of action.10 5
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA are,
however, dissimilar,'06 undermining the premise of the Second
Circuit's reliance on Robinson. The primary distinctions between
Title VII and the ADA relevant here are Title VII's inclusion of an
anti-retaliation provision, 107 absent from the ADA, and the ADA's
inclusion of an "essential function" requirement,03 absent from Title
VII. The former distinction rests on the belief that prohibiting
retaliation against former employees by giving negative references
prevents another employer from unknowingly discriminating against
applicants. °9 The expansion of Title Vi's anti-retaliation protection
from employees and applicants for employmento to former
employees"' is thus necessary to give full force to the anti-retaliation
provision."2 The ADA ignores retaliation but prohibits discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities in the "terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.""m This critical difference
eliminates the concern that prompted the anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII. Protection of disabled former employees from
discrimination by their former employers based on their disabilities is
not necessary to prevent a second employer from unknowingly
discriminating based upon disability. While granting former
employees a right of action under Title VII may effectuate the purpose
of that Act, granting former employees a right of action under the
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
104. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68.
105. See id. at 68-69 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1997)).
106. See supra Part II.B.1.
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-3(a).
110. See id.
111. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1997).
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The anti-retaliation language provides that it is unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because he
has opposed an unlawful employment practice, or because "he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing" concerning
an unlawful employment practice. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
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ADA renders its unique "essential functions" requirement
meaningless given that completely disabled former employees are
unable to perform the essential functions of an employment position
and only individuals who can perform the essential functions of a job
receive ADA protection.114
After finding the ADA's "qualified individual" language
ambiguous, resorting to the purpose of the Act, and analogizing to
Title VII, the Second Circuit held that disabled former employees
have an ADA cause of action for benefits discrimination, provided the
former employee was a "qualified individual" during the term of his
employment. 1 5 The court nonetheless observed that the ADA pro-
hibits discrimination between the disabled and non-disabled, not
discrimination among disabilities. 16 Finding no discrimination due to
disability-status on the facts, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
did not state a cause of action under the ADA."
7
B. Expansion Based Upon ADA Ambiguity Resulting
from Internal Inconsistency
In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the Third Circuit faced a
similar question. 118 Rather than finding ambiguity through the Act's
failure to state when a plaintiff must be a qualified individual, the
court found an internal inconsistency in the ADA. As a Schering
employee, Ford enrolled in a disability insurance plan, the benefits of
which continued until former employees reached age sixty-five,
provided the employee suffered from a physical disability."9 Benefits
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs.,
Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1996).
115. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 60 (1998). In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit also held that the protections of
the ADA should apply when the benefits of employment terms are reaped. See id. at 68-69. The
court posited that retirees "earned" the fringe benefits in question (i.e., VSF benefits) through
"years of service in which they performed the essential functions of their employment." Id. at
69. However, the limitations on receipt of VSF benefits, see supra note 84, were included in the
employees' collective bargaining agreement and the City Code. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 63-
64. The court should have therefore assigned knowledge of the VSF limitations to the disabled
retirees, thus deeming that the retirees would have known that the fringe benefits earned
through years of service did not include VSF benefits. In addition, a number of other courts
have rejected the proposition that the protections of the ADA should be linked with the time of
benefit receipt. See supra Part II.B.2.
116. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 70; see also supra Part 13.B.4 (discussing the limitation on
the ADA's prohibition of discrimination between the disabled and non-disabled).
117. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 70.
118. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 604-05 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 850 (1999).
119. See id. at 603-04.
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for mental disabilities, however, ceased after two years.120 When her
disability benefits expired, Ford, who suffered from a mental
disability, charged benefits discrimination and filed suit under the
ADA.121 In her pleadings, Ford admitted her inability to work even
with a reasonable accommodation.122
The Third Circuit had previously ruled plaintiffs who admit
inability to work judicially estopped from asserting qualified-
individual-with-a-disability status. 23 The court distinguished the
cases on the nature of the discrimination claim: the prior case
involved a discrimination in termination claim, while Ford implicated
benefits discrimination.1 In making this distinction, the Third
Circuit observed that the McNemar plaintiffs claim failed for internal
inconsistency-a person cannot be both completely disabled and
available for work.125 The Ford claim is not internally inconsistent, as
it never asserts the ability to work. 26
The Ford claim should fail nonetheless, because a former
employee who is unable to work has no right of action under the
ADA. 127 The Third Circuit did not reach this conclusion; instead it
held that the claim illustrated an internal contradiction in the statute:
while the ADA prohibits discrimination in the "terms, conditions, and
privileges" of employment, only employees or prospective employees
who can perform the essential functions of an employment position
with or without a reasonable accomodation may recover for such
discrimination. 12  The perceived imbalance between the rights
guaranteed under the Act and the requirements for classification as a
"qualified individual" led the court to view the ADA as ambiguous and
120. See id at 604.
121. See iii
122. See id. at 605.
123. See McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996). In McNemar,
plaintiff took two dollars from a company cash register to purchase cigarettes and did not
replace the funds. See id at 613-14. Company policy prohibited this commingling, and evidence
demonstrated that the company had terminated 52 employees for violating the policy, some
infractions involving amounts as small as two dollars. See id. at 614 n.1. When company
representatives questioned plaintiff about the infraction, he broke into tears and revealed that
he was H1V-positive. See id. at 614. The company subsequently terminated plaintiff. See id. at
614-15. Following his termination, plaintiff sought and received state and federal disability
benefits based upon his assertion that he had become totally and permanently disabled. See id.
at 615. Plaintiff then filed suit under the ADA, asserting that his termination constituted un-
lawful discrimination in violation of the ADA- See id. at 616.




127. See supra Part ILB.
128. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 605-06 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (1994)).
1999] 787
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:769
thus to consider the congressional purpose that motivated adoption of
the Act.129
Given the incongruence of rights, ostensibly protected for all,
and eligibililty to sue, apparently limited to those able to fulfill the
flmctions of an employment position, the Third Circuit proposed two
alternatives: the protections of the ADA could be limited to those able
to sue, or those able to sue could be expanded to encompass all whose
rights the ADA protects. 130 Having considered the purpose of the
statute and the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson, the Third
Circuit resolved the inconsistency by construing the ADA to allow dis-
abled former employees to sue their former employers over discrimi-
nation in provision of disability benefits. 3' Yet the Ford plaintiff won
only a Pyrrhic victory in the court's finding of a right of action, for the
court concluded that the ADA does not prohibit discrimination among
disabilities, only discrimination between individuals with and without
disabilities. 18 2 Thus, as in Castellano, the Ford plaintiff failed to state
a claim under Title I of the ADA.33
129. See id. This imbalance is the natural result of statutes, like the ADA, in which
Congress balances competing interests by limiting eligibility to sue. See Recent Case, supra
note 10, at 1121.
130. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 605-606:
Congress could have restricted the eligibility for plaintiffs under the ADA to current
employees or could have explicitly broadened the eligibility to include former employees.
Since Congress did neither but still created rights regarding disability benefits, we are
left with an ambiguity in the text of the statute regarding eligibility to sue under Title I.
131. See id. (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 34045 (1997)). The court's rea-
soning concerning the relationship between the right of former employees to bring anti-retali-
ation claims under Title VII and the right of former employees to bring benefits discrimination
claims under the ADA closely parallels that of the Castellano court. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606-
07 (reasoning that both the ADA and Title VII contain textual ambiguities and that because the
Supreme Court resolved the Title VII ambiguity by allowing former employees to bring anti-re-
taliation claims against their former employees, former employees should be given the right to
bring benefits discrimination claims against their former employers); Castellano v. City of New
York, 142 F.3d 58, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1998) (same), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 60 (1998). The Ford
court's exposition of the ADA's purpose is brief: Granting former employees a right of action "is
in keeping with the ADA's rationale, namely 'to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities... [and] to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing [such] discrimination.'"
Ford, 145 F.3d at 607 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (1994)).
132. Ford, 145 F.3d at 608.
133. Id. at 614.
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IV. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CASTELLANO
AND FORD APPROACHES
A The Problematic Application of Castellano and Ford to
Claims of Discrimination in Termination
Even assuming that Castellano and Ford are correct in
allowing disabled former employees to sue under the ADA for
discrimination in post-employment benefits provision, the next logical
holding, one that extends ADA coverage to disabled former employees
for alleged discrimination in termination, is suspect at best.
A temporal separation of employment termination and
discriminatory action distinguishes claims of benefits discrimination
from claims of discrimination in termination.' 34 In Rogers, which
involved allegations of discriminatory termination, plaintiff was
unable to work with or without reasonable accommodation both when
the alleged discrimination occurred and when his employment
relationship ended. 35 In Castellano, a case of alleged discrimination
in post-employment benefits, plaintiffs were able to work when their
employment ended but not when the alleged discrimination
occurred. 36 A House committee report states that determination of
whether a person is an individual qualified to sue should be made at
the time of the employment action.' 37 While a court could conclude
that benefits-discrimination plaintiffs are able to work at the end of
their employment and that this eligibility should constructively con-
tinue even after they later become disabled, 38 this logic does not apply
to termination-discrimination plaintiffs who are disabled at the time
of their dismissal-the employment action in question. At the time of
the employment action, disabled termination-discrimination plaintiffs
134. Compare Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 757, 759 (5th
Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiffs termination constituted both the end of employment and the
allegedly discriminatory action), with Castellano, 142 F.3d at 63-66 (finding that plaintiffs'
retirement constituted the end of employment, and the denial of VSF benefits, which occurred
some time later, constituted the allegedly discriminatory action).
135. Rogers, 87 F.3d at 757, 759.
136. Castellano, 142 F.3d at 63-66.
137. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 445,456.
138. See, e.g., Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68 (reasoning that retirees, while currently disabled,




are unable to work and are thus not qualified individuals under the
ADA.139
Protection of disabled former employees alleging dis-
crimination in their termination, the logical consequence of the
Castellano and Ford holdings, highlights the error of the Second and
Third Circuits. The ADA provides no basis for allowing the claims of
benefits-discrimination plaintiffs while barring the claims of
termination-discrimination plaintiffs, a point which suggests that
courts may either hear both types of claims or bar both types of
claims. Since termination-discrimination claims, which arise when no
temporal separation of employment termination and discriminatory
action exists, fly in the face of the ADA's express language4 and
legislative history,'4' allowing such claims would do great harm to the
Act's qualified individual requirement.42
B. Congressional Approval of Decisions Limiting
the Ability of Disabled Former Employees
to Bring Claims Under the ADA
Congressional silence following the decisions limiting ADA eli-
gibility to employees and applicants for employment who are able to
perform the essential functions of their employment positions, and
Congressional action in expressly applying the protections of the ADA
to former employees of the executive branch, suggest that Congress
approved of the interpretation that restricts ADA protections to indi-
viduals able to perform the essential functions of their employment
positions.
Some courts have given weight to congressional silence, 43
while others have not.'4 Generally, congressional silence alone is in-
139. See Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 (holding that an employee was not qualified under the ADA
because his ankle injuries made him unavailable for work). Finding no right of action in
disabled former employees alleging discrimination in termination is in keeping with the ADA's
"essential functions" definition and the legislative purpose of allowing employers to hire and
retain individuals who are able to work. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 55 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,337.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
141. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(HI), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 445,456.
142. See Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759.
143. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (stating that because Congress al-
lowed professional baseball to develop and expand unhindered by federal legislative action, its
silence constituted more than silence and passivity); Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 826 F.2d
1270, 1279 (3d Cir. 1987) (reasoning that congressional inaction was "a sufficient expression of
congressional approval" in the context of pre-judgment interest awards), abrogated on other
grounds by Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990) (involving post-
judgment interest awards, a subject with which the Poleto court dealt but did not use a
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sufficient to determine a controlling rule of law.14 However, when
congressional silence follows an accepted judicial approach of which
Congress knows, silence is at least instructive to a court faced with a
challenge to the prevailing rule.146 Following the decisions of courts
finding no right of action under the ADA for disabled former employ-
ees,147 Congress did not amend the ADA to provide disabled formerly
employed individuals eligibility to sue. While this inaction implies
Congress's acquiescence to the judicial result, it may just as well
suggest that Congress was unaware of the cases limiting eligibility to
individuals able to perform the essential functions of an employment
position.
However the subsequently-enacted Presidential and Executive
Office Accountability Act ("PEOAA)' 14  provides evidence that
Congress knew of the limitations on ADA coverage. The PEOAA
defines an "employee" as an applicant for employment or a former
employee149 This departs from both the ADA's "essential functions"
congressional silence argument, thus suggesting that Poleto's reliance upon congressional
silence was legitimate); United States v. Groupp, 459 F.2d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 1972) (stating that
the lack of adverse congressional reaction lent additional weight to an administrative
interpretation of the statute); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1310 n.13
(D.D.C. 1987) (noting the legislature's failure to overturn the Court's interpretation of a statute
for 170 years).
144. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136-37 (1991) (stating that an inference
should not be drawn from congressional silence when it is contrary to all other textual and con-
textual evidence of the legislature's intent); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946)
(declining to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a rule of law); Helvering v.
Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940) (stating that the lack of congressional repudiation of a line
of cases did not serve as an implied instruction to prohibit the Court from reexamining its doc-
trine).
145. See Girouard, 328 U.S. at 69-70 ("It is at best treacherous to find in congressional si-
lence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law").
146. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 136-37 (holding that inferences drawn from congressional
silence are not to be credited when they are contrary to other textual evidence of congressional
intent or when they render what Congress has expressly said absurd); Flood, 407 U.S. at 283
(stating that congressional silence accompanied by a consistent judicial rule and failed
congressional attempts to change the rule is sufficient to determine a controlling rule of law);
Hallock, 309 U.S. at 119-20 (declaring that congressional silence is not sufficient to determine a
rule of law when evidence does not exist to suggest that Congress explicitly approved of the
prevailing judicial interpretation). But see Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1279 (holding that congressional
silence following a consistent judicial approach is sufficient for the court to determine a rule of
law); Groupp, 459 F.2d at 182 (same); Pueblo, 663 F. Supp. at 1310 (same).
147. See sources cited supra note 3.
148. See 3 U.S.C. § 402 (1994 and Supp. H 1996) (applying the Fair Labor Standards Act,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, Chapter 71 of Title 5, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, the Worker
Adjustment and Renotification Training Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Chapter 43 of Title 38
to the executive branch).
149. See id, § 401 (1994 and Supp. H 1996).
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requirement and its definition of "employee'--an individual employed
by an employer.150 A House committee report describes the
"employee" definition in the PEOAA as "special."151 If Congress un-
derstood the ADA to protect disabled former employees, it would not
have needed to include "former employee" within the definition of
"employee" in the PEOAA. The express inclusion of former employees
within the protections of the ADA as applied to the Executive
Branch, 52 when coupled with the congressional statement that the
PEOAA contains a "special" definition of "employee,"15s indicates that
Congress recognized the court-imposed limitations on eligibility to sue
under the ADA. Given the then-uniformly applied exclusion of dis-
abled former employees from the ADA's "qualified individual" defini-
tion,15 and Congress's awareness of this rule,155 Congress's silence
should be instructive to a court resolving the question of a former em-
ployee's eligibility to sue under the ADA.156 The Castellano and Ford
courts reach a conclusion contrary to that which Congress's silence
suggests. 57
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4),(8) (1994).
i51. H.R. REP. No. 104-820, at 29 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4348,4364.
152. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (1994 and Supp. 1 1996).
153. H.R. REP. No. 104-820, at 29 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.N. 4348,4364.
154. See sources cited supra note 3.
155. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 401-402; H.R. REP. No. 104-820, at 28-29 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. 4348, 4363-64 (amending the definition of "employee" to include former
employees).
156. The Supreme Court has held that even where congressional silence leads a court to a
conclusion, the weight of Congress's silence is to be disregarded if the conclusion is contrary to
the textual evidence of congressional intent or if the conclusion is absurd. See Burns v. United
States, 501 U.S. 129, 136-37 (1991). The text and legislative history of the ADA suggest that
Congress intended to limit eligibility to sue to individuals who are able to perform the essential
functions of an employment position. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994);
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.N. 303, 337 (stating that a
"qualified individual" must be able to perform essential functions, or tasks that are fundamental
and not marginal, of the job); see also sources cited supra note 3. This is also the result that
Congress's silence suggests. While some courts have suggested that restricting the abiilty of
disabled former employees to sue under the ADA is the result of ambiguous statutory language,
see Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606-07 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
850 (1999); Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 60 (1998), no court has suggested that limiting eligibility to sue to those able to perform
essential job functions is absurd. Thus the suggestion that results from Congress's si-
lence-that disabled former employees do not constitute "qualified individuals" who are eligible
to sue under the ADA-should meet the Burns test.
157. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 606-07; Castellano, 142 F.3d at 69. One commentator has
argued that the Third Circuit should have used the Ford case as a way "to alert Congress that
the current statutory scheme excludes protections for a significant number of disabled litigants,"
rather than an opportunity to adopt a strained interpretation of the law. Recent Case, supra




Decisions of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, as well
as a number of federal district courts establish that a disabled former
employee has no cause of action under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The Second and Third Circuits have reached the
contrary result-that the ADA grants a disabled former employee the
right to sue his former employer-when the plaintiff alleges discrimi-
nation in post-employment benefits. The latter courts overlook the
plain meaning of the "essential functions" requirement and improp-
erly find the ADA's language ambiguous. With misplaced reliance on
the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson, these courts have issued
unprincipled decisions that render the express language of the statute
meaningless. Congress's silence following decisions limiting eligibility
to sue under the ADA to those able to perform the essential functions
of an employment position and its subsequent express inclusion of
former employees in the ADA as it applies to the executive branch
indicates that the Second and Third Circuits should have limited the
scope of the ADA's protections, unpalatable as this result may be.
The Ford and Castellano decisions are expressly confined to
plaintiffs alleging discrimination in post-employment benefits provi-
sion. Even assuming that the Second and Third Circuits have
reached the proper conclusion on this issue, claims of discrimination
in post-employment benefits and discrimination in termination are
unique. The reasoning that allowed disabled former employees to
bring ADA actions in the benefits arena cannot logically apply to
claims of discrimination in termination, where the "essential func-
tions" requirement governs. Ford and Castellano have significantly
undermined the "essential functions" requirement of the ADA, and, to
the extent that the reasoning of these courts applies to plaintiffs
asserting discrimination in termination, employers would be forced to
reinstate employees unable to perform the necessary functions of
their employment position-a result Congress did not intend.
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